

Internet, Social Capital, and Democracy in the Information Age:
Korea's Defeat Movement, the Red Devils, Candle Light Anti-U.S.
Demonstration, and Presidential Election during 2000-2002

Han, Jongwoo
jonghan@maxwell.syr.edu

Assistant Professor
Department of Political Science
&
Senior Associate
Information and Computing Technology Group
The Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs
&
Fellow
System Assurance Institute
Syracuse University

Abstract: Drawn to unparalleled opportunities created by cyberspace, social scientists have attempted to identify the impact of the information technology revolution on democratic governance. Will new technologies promote democracy? If so, how will they change the political landscape and interact with preexisting factors in society? These questions are closely related to one of the most distressing indicators for the future of democracy, the undiminishing presence of an apolitical constituency, especially within the young generation. Thus, the excluded young generation had no voice, leaving the foundation of political systems vulnerable to the issues of democratic unaccountability and weak legitimacy. This phenomenon arose from the mechanism of the public sphere in the industrial age, which is geared toward maintaining the existing power relationships rather than toward reflecting changes in society. Korea's recent experience has clearly indicated that in the information age, the Internet, when combined with social capital, can change such disproportionate power relationships. The Internet as a new public sphere successfully serves as an explosive means of reconnecting the tacit majority with social issues and empowering the mostly apolitical young generation as a new political force. In so doing, it will be the most critical feature on the future map of power configuration in democracy. This article argues that information technology alone does not determine the successful evolution of democracy. Rather, it is social capital that produced unprecedented political revolution in Korea. This suggests that the impact of information technology on the prospects for a country's democracy is highly dependent upon its social capital. This article analyzes how major socio-political breakthroughs were accomplished and how the transitions in social capital from offline to online were facilitated in Korea by the Internet.

Keywords: Internet, democracy, social capital, generational shift, public sphere, informatization, Korea

Internet, Social Capital, and Issues of Democracy

Scholars agree on two points for the establishment of democracy: the breakdown of the dominant power system and the establishment of fair election process in countries in transition (O'Donnell, 2002; Nodia, 2002). Fair elections seem to be the foundation for the dismantlement of the dominant power system through purposive political action (O'Donnell, 2002). Programs for political and socioeconomic reforms have been employed, but history has illustrated that these remain temporary measures unless political forces against dominant power groups are fully established in the power structure. In short, the successful transition toward democracy requires new counter forces and effective measures. This article argues that civil or non-governmental activism as a counter force and information technology as a means of creating a new public sphere are critical for successful democratic evolution.

Korea is the illuminating example. Korean society overcame authoritarian and military dictatorship in the late 1980s. As a result, tremendous power of civic activism was created. Subsequently, the recent ten-year period has clearly demonstrated that the Internet, when combined with human networks, can be a revolutionary tool for both political and social changes. The mainly offline social capital, the 386¹ Generation played

a vanguard role in Korea's democratization in the late 1980s against the military dictatorship and contributed to the revolutionary reshuffles in the 2000 General Election with Internet power, for the first time in Korean election history. In addition, born in cyberspace, the online 2030 Generation successfully achieved major player status by demonstrating *Netizen* power in a series of socially instigated political events.

In the 2000 Korean general election, highlighted by world news media, the 'Defeat Movement' illustrated the power of information technology in campaign and election processes as well as in the power mechanism of political parties. For the first time in Korea's election history, a massive Internet-based negative campaign was launched by citizen alliances led by the '386' Generation. As an example of social capital, it comprises the common denominators of: resources, networks, and associational membership for certain norms, attitude, action for a goal, and trust. Scholars see social capital as resources for making some social actions possible. The result of the 386 Generation movement was reflected as an earthquake-like reshuffling in National Assembly seats. This unprecedented event shocked the conventional political system and existing power groups. Later ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, it provoked a wide range of controversies on the legality of citizen activities in cyberspace. The new public sphere of cyberspace created by the Internet enabled off-line social capital, the 386 Generation, and the alliances of civic organizations to launch an unprecedented negative campaign to outflank political and media gatekeepers and to have their voices decisively heard in the election outcomes.

Prior to taking an interest in politics, the computer/Internet oriented Generation of '2030' attracted global attention to the recent 2002 Korea/Japan World Cup championship game by mobilizing national unity and energy in their cheering led by the Red Devils, the Internet-based official fan club of Korea's national soccer team. Impressed by the team's performance, the whole nation poured into main streets in every province and created the phenomenon of 'street cheering'. In the political realm, the Internet empowered an apolitical young generation '2030' to mobilize its potential first into social and later into political power in a massive anti-American candle light demonstration right before the December 19, 2002 presidential election, contributing to the election of ruling party candidate Rho Moo Hyun and to the defeat of opposition party candidate Lee contrary to general expectation.

The two year long series of upheavals illustrate that Korean society is a laboratory demonstrating how rapid development in informational technology interacts with social capital to produce social and political changes. This raises several important issues on the future of democracy and governance in the information age. First, the Internet is creating new kinds of public spheres and social capital previously absent from major social and political discourse. It targets and educates a new constituency, mostly in its teens and twenties, provides previously unavailable information, and promotes interconnectivity among people. A newly created cyber public sphere may provide a remedy for reconnection and political participation implying that the major failure of mutual interactions between state and society in twentieth century democracy can be overcome.

Second, the Internet cultivates new social capital very differently from the way that offline social capital has been generated and passed on to successive generations. Due to its effectiveness as a communications channel, the Internet shortens the time in which social issues become part of the national agenda, especially among populations previously excluded from the national discourse. The time needed for one generation to learn from previous one is also shortened. In newly created Internet cyberspace, the young generation, which did not use to factor in major social and political discourses in Korean society, is becoming a major player. The political orientation of the offline 386 generation was smoothly handed on to the 2030 apolitical young generation through the 2002 World Cup and candle light anti-U.S. demonstrations. Through these mobilizations enabled in cyberspace, they became conscious of their political potential and so were able to conduct a last minute digital get-out-the-vote campaign securing the election of Rho. Despite the young generation's original apolitical tendency, its impact on the public sphere can no longer be ruled out since the Internet certainly does influence the formation and application of social capital.

Third, Korean cases illuminate important points about how advanced information technology interacts with the evolutionary dynamics of social capital. Neither technology nor social capital alone explains these cases. Timely establishment of information infrastructure with civic organizations activated since the late 1980s seems to be the basis for the series of socio-political changes. The Korean cases prove Diani's argument (2001) that social capital is an outcome of a series of social movements. Through the Internet, the learning process from the '386' generation to the '2030' seems to have been shortened considering that major political revolutions in two major elections and globally highlighted social events occurred in only two years. A new generation learned that it could make differences in social and political arenas by setting up agendas and interconnecting and organizing them in virtual space. The young generation's achievements stem directly from the 386 generation's Defeat Movement. Unhampered by national boundaries, civic organizations in Japan attempted to apply the Korean model of a Defeat-type cyber Movement and to adopt a negative campaign in cyberspace in their recent elections. This article argues that the Internet adds new dimensions to public spheres, co-opting new, previously fragile portions of the population into it and changing the picture of the public sphere and social capital.

Cyberspace as a new Public Sphere in the Information Age

The classical/liberal notion of the public sphere as a realm where individuals can discuss and debate issues of common concern emerged during the era of Enlightenment and 18th century democratic revolutions. Discourses in the realms of the public sphere have involved the intellectual activities of witnessing, analyzing, exposing, and criticizing common issues in society. Writings, speeches, pictures and other artistic forms of activities were main mediums in the public sphere (Habermas, 1989, 1991; Kellner, 1998:169). Spatial and temporal dimensions limited the classical notion of the public sphere in many ways. Developments in computer and telecommunications technologies, however, have diminished the power of the industrial age notion of the public sphere. Many of the changes in political systems and agents that have been studied stem from the

characteristics of the new public sphere created by the information technology revolution. The Internet is “a network defined by a suite of protocols that are open and nonproprietary and that require no personal identification to be accessed and used” (Lessig, 1999: 27). In turn, the Internet creates cyberspace where conventional laws and custom are replaced by a series of codes coordinating the flow of digital bits. In cyberspace, according to Lessig, the code is law made up of Internet protocol, software and hardware, making cyberspace a realm regulated not by sociopolitical logic but rather by the mechanical logic of information distribution. As a new form of regulator in cyberspace, the code generates several features in public sphere discourse.

First, the code creates anonymity. Methods of identification and authentication are intrinsically limited. New public spheres of cyberspace are controlled by new rules of the game. These include almost unlimited broadband networks composed of all existing telecommunications networks and Internet architecture regulated by telecommunication protocols such as TCP/IP. However, these protocols and servers reveal nothing about Internet users and very little about the data being exchanged. (Lessig, 1999: 32) Thus, cyberspace becomes a socially unregulated sanctuary of diverse opinions and interests for the apolitical young generation, a tacit and excluded constituency.

Second, cyberspace extends the industrial age notion of the public sphere, markedly reducing the costs of participation. Using a public facility with Internet access, an individual can construct a webpage at little expense. Getting public attention depends upon the content of the website. Gatekeepers such as editors, publishers, newspapers, and political parties have significantly lost their regulating power. A server can be located anywhere and the Internet is everywhere but nowhere. Its protocols enable agents to evade the conventional power of public sphere gatekeepers and government jurisdiction. Internet architecture is significantly altering conditions that structure and constrain social and legal power. It checks the top-down power of government while promoting an extremely effective scope for bottom-up control.

In short, a new regulator, the code, is a mechanism for being open, transparent, everywhere, and untamed. In this cyber public sphere, alliances of civic forces achieved election revolution, and the Red Devils gained global attention through street cheering. Table 1 summarizes the main characteristics of this newly created public sphere.

[Table 1] Characteristics of the Public Spheres in both eras

Industrial Age	Criteria	Internet Age
Legal values: Constitution, statutes	Origins of Architecture	Impersonal, mechanical Computer code, protocol, software, hardware
Controllable by Intermediation: Separation of publisher from author	Power relations	Less intermediated, Self-representative
Identifiable	Identification	Anonymous
Regulable	Regulability	Avoidable

Accountable institutions	Accountability	Latent ambiguity
Spatially & temporally limited	Articulations of Medium	Everywhere & nowhere

Korea and Informatization: Explosive Usage of the Internet

Korea’s informatization was mainly driven by the government’s reinventing efforts in the public sector and economic restructuring in the 1997 IMF (International Monetary Fund) crisis. Three major points in informatization stand out: actual usage of information technology in daily life, heavy concentration of Internet usage in the young generation, and timing in the high-penetration rate of the Internet.

In overall rankings of the informatization index among 50 countries, Korea does not belong to the leading group in technological infrastructure. According to the White Paper of the National Computerization Agency of Korea based on the data released by the International Telecommunications Union, Korea has ranked in the middle group. Korea was 21st from 1995 to 1998, 19th in 1999, and 17th in 2000. Changes in its somewhat progressive but not top-ranking Informatization index do not specifically explain a series of socio-political upheavals during the period of 2000 to 2002.

However, careful study of Korea’s informatization reveals very interesting statistical facts, differentiating Korea from other leading countries. Table 2 supports this argument. Weekly hours spent on PC communication and the Internet almost tripled in July 2000 compared to those of three years before in April 1997. Also, computer ownership almost equates with Internet use by showing the main purpose for having one in the year 2000 to be 5 times that of 1997. These numbers present the overall picture of how information technology infrastructure for daily use is well established connecting most household and citizens to new cyber public spheres.

[Table 2] ICT access and opportunity of individuals and households

	Proportions of households with computers (%)	PC literacy rate of aged 6 years and more (%)	Hours spent on computer use per week (hours)	Individuals whose purpose of computer use is PC comm. & Internet (%)	Hours spent on PC comm.& Internet per week
April 1997	29.0	39.9	5.9	7.9	4.2
July 2000	46.4	51.6	17.2	40.4	10.4
Increase	17.4%	11.7%	11.3 hrs	32.5%	6.2 hrs

Source: 2000 Social Statistical Survey (Korean National Statistical Office, 2001)

A more interesting finding lies in the demographics of the computer and Internet generations. Looking at Korea’s current population of 47,639,618 by age in Table 3 gives another picture in the context of Internet users and literacy. Those who are very active in Internet use fall into the age group from elementary school aged students to adults in their

forties, accounting for 72.2 percent of the total population. In terms of human capital, this human capital constitutes Korean society's potential for forming new public spheres in cyberspace and for mobilizing social capital on issues. The young generation previously excluded from socio/political debates and discourses is now being incorporated as a major stakeholder in the new public spheres.

[Table 3] Population in Korea by Age

Age Range	Total	Percent	Accumulative Percentage
0-4	3,048,362	6.4%	6.4%
5-19	10,150,888	21.3%	27.6%
20s	8,061,785	16.9%	44.6%
30s	8,564,652	18%	62.6%
40s	7,598,827	16%	78.6%
50s	4,534,603	9.5%	88.1%
Over 60s	5,680,501	12%	100.1%

Source: KNSO, numbers current

Table 4 shows a dramatic increase in Internet use among the young generation. For students from seven to nineteen and in their twenties, the growth of Internet penetration doubled from October, 1999 to June, 2001. It almost tripled for those in their thirties. Also, according to KRNIC, 96.85 percent of elementary, 99.8 percent of junior high school, 99.9 percent of senior high school, and 99.3 percent of college students regularly use the Internet. The R generation² approximately corresponds to two age groups from teens to 20s. Heavy concentration in the young generation in the age composition of Internet users has directed the progress of the information society in Korea, producing new socio-political power groups or generations such as the '386' and 'R generation.' The new 'codes', which do not discriminate among people by their ages or jobs, now mechanically distribute information over cyberspace and these young generation members can form public spheres of their own, bypassing conventional gatekeepers and having their voices heard in political and social discourse. Cybercodes determine winners and losers.

[Table 4] Internet Penetration Rate in Korea by Age (%)

Age Range Time	7-19	20s	30s	40s	50s
Oct. '99	33.6	41.9	18.5	12.8	2.9
Mar. '00	51.5	59.1	29.2	8.6	3.3
Aug. '00	65.9	65.9	35.4	18.5	4.3
Dec. '00	74.1	74.6	43.6	22.7	5.7
Mar. '01	81.6	78.4	48.4	29	6.3
Jun. '01	87.6	80.3	54.1	32.2	7.3
Sep. '01	91.1	84	61.3	36.6	8.3
Dec. '01	93.3	84.6	61.6	35.6	8.7

Source: Korea Network Information Center (KRNIC: <http://stat.nic.or.kr/>), December 2001.

In early 1990s, Internet users in Korean society were not noticeable. Only in the very late 1990s did Internet infrastructure and usage dramatically expand. A great leap forward in this category took place from 1998 to 1999. Since 1999, every year almost one fourth of the total population was newly added to this category. In 2001, two years after, Korea became an Internet society where more than half the total population accessed and used the Internet. Table 5 clearly demonstrates that the growth rate of the number of Internet users doubled each year from 1995 until 1998, tripled in 1999. Table 6, on the monthly increasing number of Internet Protocol Addresses, also supports this argument. It is well reflected in world statistics among leading countries in Informatization. Point Topic's recent report (2002) confirms that South Korea with 6,076,200 lines has more DSL lines than any other country in the world.

[Table 5] Number of Internet Users in Korea (1,000 persons)

Year	'95	'96	'97	'98	'99	'00	'01
#s	366	731	1,634	3,103	10,860	19,040	24,380

Source: Korean Network Information Center (KRNIC)

[Table 6] Number of IP Address

Feb '95	Feb. '96	Apr. '97	Feb. '98	Feb. '99	Dec. '99	Feb '00	Dec. '00	Feb. '01	Feb. '02	June '02
3,745	7,329	13,885	16,285	19,613	28,342	11,188,736		18,921,984	22,985,216	23,509,504

Source: Korean Network Information Center (KRNIC)

Not only the speed but also the timing of such unprecedented expansions in Internet environments deserves attention. A rapidly increasing rate in the penetration of Internet usage into the total population resulted in the formation of powerful political forces. In the 2000 general election, empowered citizens and their alliance defeated corrupt politicians from the National Assembly. Taking Diani's (2001) argument that social capital is an outcome of social movement, this article argues that the 386 Generation is a form of social capital stemming from democratization movements since the 1960s without the Internet. This social capital combined with the Internet was able to produce unprecedented political power in citizens and civic organizations affecting election outcome of 2000 General Election for the National Assembly. While the 386 Generation was born as a fairly coherent group across university campus in the 1980s, the 2002 World Cup has demonstrated that the Internet can facilitate social capital transforming a numerous and unspecified mass into a cohesive human resources, the Red Devils. The young generation has been brought up with substantial growth in civil society in Korea since late 1980s. They indirectly experienced the power of civil society that reversed the traditional hierarchical relationships between strong state and weak society, and between power groups and voters.

Social Capital

Social capital is considered one of the most important ingredients in achieving democracy and a successful economy in a society (Bourdieu, 1986; Putnam, 1993, 1995; Coleman, 1988; Fukuyama, 1995; OECD, 2001). The term 'social capital' was first used

in 1972 eventually developing the triad of physical, cultural, and social capitals (Bourdieu, 1986). While Coleman and Bourdieu take a sociological approach, Putnam takes a political one. The former focus on the more functional and instrumental aspects of social capital; the latter emphasize collective actions contributing to democracy. Putnam emphasizes the density of face-to-face contacts. The volume of social capital, according to Bourdieu, depends on the size of the network of connections that can be effectively mobilized.

Synthesizing divergent perspectives, this article defines social capital as multiple human resources networks, either actual or potential, with certain characteristics of shared norms, attitude, and trust that can be mobilized for social and political actions. Typically, social capital is to be formed through specific social and political events. In other words, social capital is an outcome of experience in socio-political movements. Two major stages are important: consensus building through the public sphere and mobilization for actions. Historical and ideological backgrounds may affect the overall features of social capital in a country. The medium for information sharing infrastructure and public discourse, however, plays a decisive role in actual mobilization of social capital for specific social/political movements.

It is important to remember that industrial age definitions of social capital reflected an offline reality. In that notion of the public sphere, major news and media exerted a monopolistic influence on the formation of social capital. Limitations in the public sphere and communication systems during the industrial age impose several features upon social capital. It took much more time to build relationships forming toward a social capital because the medium for interconnectivity and information sharing was limited. Gatekeepers in major news media shaped and regulated discourse, thereby resulting in the exclusion of some population segments from discourse, typically have-nots, women, minorities, and youngsters. The amount of information in print and on broadcast media was limited, too.

However, the new information age public sphere, cyberspace, overcomes industrial age limitations in terms of social capital formation. There are virtually no limits to the amount and speed of information distributed via the Internet, which targets new population groups. Thus the Internet opens up new possibilities for marshalling forces against dominant power systems and for shifting attention to emerging issues. Information technology has enabled the current generation to share ideas and to build consensus for actions more quickly than previous generations could. In short, the learning effect has been accelerated.

Generations in post-Civil War Korean history (1950-53) can be categorized into the following two groups: the post-War 386, and the 2030 Generations. The 386 Generation was politically oriented. It grew up during the economic recovery period under authoritarian regime. The 2030 generation refers to young people in their twenties and thirties with the following characteristics: oriented for individualism, tending to be apolitical, and wired.

[Table 7] Comparison of 386 and R Generations

	386 Generation	2030 generation (Red Devils)	
		N Generation	R Generation
Age range	40s	20s and 30s	Teens and 20s
Origin	Anti-military dictatorship, democratic movement	Social	Sports fans
Nature	Political Group Orientation	Social Individualistic	Social & Diverse Group-oriented but respecting individuality
Network	Face-to-face	Face-to-face & Internet	Internet
Public Goods	Democracy Political Watchdog	Club or association	Public Awareness Social energy Order, Safety

In Korea, the notion of the state's superiority over civil society has long been entrenched. The 386 Generation's aggressive political stance contributed to the 1986 June Resistance against military dictatorship, in which that unbalanced relationship was overturned upside down. During the democratization process of the early 1980s, militant anti-government organizations had multiplied and formed civic alliances. Their very clear political goal was to achieve democracy. After the inauguration of civilian democratic government in 1993, they lost their target for action and reason for existence. They began to divert their primary interests from political matters to socio-economic areas such as consumer protection, economic justice, and environmental protection.

Table 8³ shows that around the mid-1990s the spheres of civil society expanded. Organizations with the adjective 'citizen' or Non-Governmental Organizations increased at astonishing rates. Until 1995, the total numbers of newspaper references remained within 500. However, since 1996, the increasing rate in the total amount of newspaper coverage has almost doubled. Especially, the year 2000 marked the most rapid increase in newspaper coverage from 1892 in 1999 to 3512 in 2000. In 1991, no major newspaper used the term, 'NGO'. Newspaper coverage using the term, 'Citizen Organization' stood at little more than 100. In nine years, it has grown twenty fold. The rapidly growing influence of civic organizations in Korea corresponds to rapid informatization there in 1999 and 2000.

[Table 8] Five Major Korean Newspapers' Coverage on Civic Organizations

Year	Citizen Org.	NGO	Private Org.	Social Org.	Total in Average
1991	91	0	138	189	418
1992	103	8	212	175	498
1993	102	11	151	152	416
1994	114	16	146	144	420
1995	147	63	108	138	456

1996	323	44	177	210	754
1997	510	50	234	302	1096
1998	631	32	235	311	1209
1999	1183	227	204	278	1892
2000	2515	295	241	461	3512

Source: Table 2-1 from Choo, Sungsoo and Nam, Jungil. 2001. Korea NGO Report, 2001, Seoul: Hanyang University Press, page. 25.

The democratization movement in the late 1980s and the revolutionary Internet campaign in the 2000 General Election support Diani’s claims (2001:207-8) that social capital is an outcome of social movement. According to Diani (2001:207), “the identification of causal paths linking movement actions to certain outcomes has proved to be a major problem.” The explosive growth of civic organizations since the June Resistance in 1987 and the world leading index of actual Internet usage in Korea during 1999-2000 serve as evidence for the arguments of Diani and of this article. Two major civic organizations, the Citizens' Council for Economic Justice (CCEJ, Kyung-shil-lyun in Korean; <http://www.ccej.or.kr/main.html>), the nation's largest civic organization established in 1989 and Cyber People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (Cham-yeo-yeon-dae in Korean; <http://www.peoplepower21.org/>) established in 1994, formed the Citizens' Commission for a Fair Election. This alliance carried out a revolutionary election campaign by motivating citizen participation. The fact that the actions of the 386 Generation in the Defeat Movement, which was an outcome of the 1980’s democratization movement, led to specific election outcomes in 2000 responds to Diani’s concern about establishing a causal link between movements and outcomes. This supports Diani’s (2001:208, 207) claim that “mobilization processes rely heavily upon previous networks of exchange and solidarity” and, thus, we need to “focus on their capacity to create new forms of social capital.”

In short, the alliance of civic organizations united for a fair election in 2000 was a by-product of the 1980s’ democratization process led by the 386 Generation. Information technology equipped that social capital with a powerful means for creating an effective communication channel. Thus, the group’s political agenda was achieved in cyberspace through the Defeat Movement. Also social capital bestowed political purpose on Internet technology and cyberspace. This union of information technology and social capital revolutionized the election process.

The First Election Revolution: The Defeat Movement

By releasing a blacklist of 164 unfit candidates for the April 13th, 2000 National Assembly election, civic activism fueled a hot debate in Korean politics. The Citizens' Council for Economic Justice (CCEJ, Kyung-shil-lyun in Korean), the nation's largest civic organization and the best by-product of the 1980s democratization movement (Chosun.com, 2000; JoongAng, 2000; Korea Herald, 2000) was joined by the Citizens' Commission for a Fair Election in motivating citizen participation. Several web sites such as www.ngokorea.org, www.naksun.co.kr, and www.democracy.co.kr were created to defeat the listed political figures based on evidence of crimes such as corruption or

embezzlement related to past elections, political and voting records, change of party affiliation, and personal flaws such as unethical behavior and vulgar or discriminatory statements. Conventionally, the party nomination process had been obscured in back-room deals between party leaders and candidates. The old practices of selecting party candidates were based more on personal relationships with party leaders or on the scale of funds contributed to political parties than on objective evaluations of candidates' qualifications and electability.

With the Citizens' Coalition for the 2000 General Election's home page (www.ngokorea.org) recording 50,000 visitors in five days since its opening, the Internet made its mark as the most influential public sphere and medium for networking. Singling out reform-resistant lawmakers, exploiters of regional antagonism, and 'low-quality' politicians, the list included 128 members of the National Assembly, 42 percent of the incumbents, out of a total of 299 seats. 86 incumbents were targeted by the defeat movement. Table 9 summarizes the revolutionary outcome of the General Election for the National Assembly in April, 2000.

[Table 9] The Result of Defeat Movement in the 2000 General Election

	Number of Candidates	Percentage
Defeated	59	68.6%
Elected	27	31.4%
Total	86	100%

Source: <http://2000.ngokorea.org/main.htm>

59 incumbents out of 86 listed in the Citizens' Coalition for the 2000 General Election's home page failed to gain seats in the National Assembly, which counts for 68.6 percent of the total listed in cyberspace. This unprecedented election illustrates the changes made by Internet. First of all, a new form of governance in the information age, a public policy jury system, proposed by Rosell (1999), was tested for the first time in Korea, where no such system had ever been tried even for judicial processes. The Hundred Member Jury representing a diverse spectrum of total demography was set up by the Citizens' Coalition to review unfit candidates. Since then, it has become a tradition for civic alliances to establish a Hundred Member Jury system when making important public decisions. This system has also come to exert tremendous influence over the conventional power structure. The Internet empowers citizens and has brought forth a new institution in Korean politics.

Second, unlike in advanced democratic countries, where civic groups such as Americans for Democratic Action (<http://adaction.org>) legally rate the activities of their representatives and other elected officials, the current election law in Korea prohibits negative campaigning by any except individuals and labor unions. Reflecting the interests of incumbents, the Constitutional Court and the Central Election Management Commission upheld the current election law on the grounds that it keeps elections fair. Reacting to the denunciation of vested rights, and supported by the public, civic organizations launched a national campaign to revise the election law.

The outcomes were revolutionary. The ‘defeat movement’ established a democratic foundation for fair elections and for meaningful participation by making a negative campaign a reality and by institutionalizing a Hundred Member Jury system. Evidence of its success came from the political community. On January 19, the twentieth day after the release of the blacklist, the ruling and opposition parties bowed to citizen activism and promised to refer to or respect the blacklist in the nominating process for the April general election (Koreaherald, 2000). Political parties and leaders are no longer immune to ongoing pressure from civic organizations for legalizing negative campaigns.

The Korean experiment also set a milestone for democratic governance in the information age. Rosell (1999:178) claims that the information technology revolution will enable “a strategic conversation” in a society, shifting decision-making power from conventional authority to civil society. He suggests that a public jury system be a new institutional center in that conversation. Rosell’s blueprint for information age governance was clearly realized in a series of socio/political movements from 2000 to 2002 in Korea. Through the power of information technology, the Internet had swiftly formed the alliance of over 300 civic organizations, enabling them to establish a political dialogue on reforming the election process and on establishing the influence of civil society over conventional authority. Pressure for a more transparent political system made the party nominating process more objective and dismantled the absolute power of a handful of party leaders. The information society, thus, is beginning to erode existing political systems and ideology, bringing about the devolution of power monopoly resting in political parties and the state. The Internet and social capital produced a powerful synergic effect and made possible substantial progress in democracy.

Finally, this case also illustrated that information technology is creating many zones where conventional jurisdiction does not apply. The national government has no established legal authority to restrict the flow of information if a negative campaign web site is opened overseas even though it exerts domestic influence. This Korean case clearly indicates that the dispersed availability of information and communications technologies can be far more relevant than levels of income for predicting a nation's degree of democratization. Revolutionary election outcomes generated by the Internet and by their seniors created a learning effect for the young generation, who were later to carry out another unprecedented phenomenon in the history of Korean social capital, the Red Devils.

World Cup, Red Devils and the R Generation

Having witnessed the potential realized by the combined forces of the Internet and the 386 Generation, the apolitical but IT-friendly Internet generation of 2030 began to emerge as a major force taking full advantage of the Internet in the non-political arena at first. To the amazement of soccer-crazed Europe and Latin America, a cumulative 22 million people, mostly high school and college students, spontaneously poured onto the streets of Seoul and other major cities to support Korea in its seven World cup matches. (Yoo, July 2, 2002) Networking through the Internet, this official 120,000-member fan club of the national soccer team, the Red Devils revived a national ethos of ‘can-do

spirit,' which had been depressed by national financial bankruptcy, in the 1997 IMF crisis. Despite how quickly such huge numbers had been gathered, there were no accidents, disturbances, or crimes reported. Crowds behaved in such an orderly fashion that National Police Commissioner Lee, Pal-ho sent a letter to the Red Devils thanking them for their exemplary support, which contributed to hosting a "safe World Cup."

Table 7 provides an overall comparative picture of two generations. Inheritors of the first civilian, democratic regime in 1993, but also witnesses to national bankruptcy in their juvenile period, the R generation's main goal has been to achieve individual goals, especially material security while ignoring politics. Though generally anonymous to each other, they are connected well enough by the Internet to form formidable opinion and action groups on issues.⁴ While the 386 Generation networked face-to-face, the Red Devils exchanged views and feelings about World Cup matches through instant messenger, to which Korea has more than 10 million subscribers.

Throughout the 2002 World Cup Game, the 2030 Generation transformed itself from being apolitical and apathetic to being socially sensitive, passionate, and active. It also came to realize its power in consensus building over cyber space and in networking capacity for actions. The newly socially sensitive 2030 Generation was transformed into a major political player through the candle light anti-American demonstration ignited by the death of two Korean girls. The cyber public sphere is successfully creating a counter force to the entrenched power system.

Transition from Social to Political Capital: Candle Light Anti-U.S. Demonstration

In June 2002, a U.S. military tribunal acquitted two U.S. soldiers of negligent homicide. Two school girls had been killed by an armored vehicle. This decision worsened the anti-Americanism in a mostly pro-American country. On November 27, at 6 am, the Netizen *Ang-Ma*⁵ appealed to the public through instant messenger to fill the Kwanghwamoon (the main gate of Kyungbok Palace, Seoul's symbolic political center) with Korean spirits and to be fireflies for the victims, Hyosoon and Miseon. Within 24 hours, 90 percent of total MSN Messenger users in Korea had posted a mourning badge on their homepages, and approximately ten thousand *fireflies* gathered at the Kwanghwamoon on November 30⁶ to mourn the deaths of the two girls. Disregarding the half-century long discourse on the mutual relationship between the United States and Korea, the Netizen defied the authority of the conservative pro-US older generation.

Having witnessed the power of the Internet in the Defeat Movement in 2000, and in the Red Devils experience, the originally apolitical young generation became a major political factor in the 2002 Presidential Election because the candle light demonstration was heavily politicized in the election debate. It served as a catalyst for giving the 2030 Generation veto power in domestic politics. In turn, this Internet-based anti-American political movement critically affected last year's presidential election, mobilizing the young generation in favor of the ruling party candidate, Rho, who wants to rectify Korea's dependent relationship with the United States.

Power Transition through Presidential Election

The social capital of the 2030 Generation culminated in the presidential election on December 19, 2002. This war of the allied 386 and 2030 generations versus the over-fifty Civil War generation was also a war of digital versus analog campaigns. In the beginning, there were three candidates. Rho of the ruling party appealed to younger voters by means of digital strategies, while Lee of the opposition party appealed to older voters by means of analog strategies. The World Cup political star, Chung, who had successfully held the event and had run for president based on his new party, National Alliance 21, was first independent. However, later he entered into an agreement with Rho such that the winner of a poll conducted among their party members would become a united front candidate. Rho won the poll. Despite Rho's very minor lead over the opposition party candidate Lee, news media predicted that Lee would win by carrying undecided voters. Unexpectedly, Chung withdrew his support for Rho around 8 hours before voting began. Fearing the loss of Chung's supporters, Rho supporters came out to vote. Furthermore, the No-Sa-Mo⁷, Rho's Internet fan club, orchestrated a last minute mobilization of young voters, playing a central role in Rho's 560,000 vote margin of victory.

During the 8 hours from 10 pm December 18 until election morning, Netizen online activities broke cyber space records. Rho's supporters rallied using MSN Messenger and cellular phones. From midnight to 3 am, page view in naver.com recorded 3 million visits, five times its daily average (Lee and Choi, 2002). The Daum.com (www.daum.net) server temporarily went down due to overloading of its presidential election website (Kang, 2002). With turnout at its lowest of all 70.8% on the morning of the election, Rho's supporters used their cellular phones to encourage voting. From 11 am to 1 pm, 18 million mobile phone calls were recorded. (Lee and Choi, 2002) Visitors to the ruling party Web site recorded 860,855 hits, 200,000 more than the daily average and postings to the bulletin boards on the party web site doubled on that day (Kang, 2002).

For this election, three organizations had been formed to monitor fairness. The first, the 2030 Network, established on October 22, 2002 to promote participation by the 50% of total voters in their twenties and thirties (<http://vote.daum.net/power/2030net/>), aimed to gather one million signatures from young generation voters petitioning for the establishment of polling places for 600,000 absentee university students. As a direct outcome, the first-ever decision to install polling booths on several college campuses was made. Also, formed by around 300 civic organizations, the 2002 Presidential Election Alliance (www.ivote.or.kr) was a continuation of the Defeat Movement of 2000, as clearly shown on its web site (<http://vote.daum.net/power/partner>), which acknowledges its debt to the Defeat Movement. Finally, from November 19 to December 18, the Messenger System for presidential election participation, instituted by the Citizens' Action network, and Daum.net, (http://vote.daum.net/join_msg), comprised of Messenger activists, shared their views on the presidential election and played a pivotal role in encouraging the young generation to vote for Rho (http://www.wv.or.kr/cma/cma_what.htm).

Table 10 shows clear distinctions in presidential preferences between the 2030 Generation and the Civil War Generation. This table explains how Rho was supported by the 2030 Netizen and was elected president.

[Table 10] Presidential Election and 2030 Generation

Age Ranges (% out of Total Population*)	Internet Access Rates**	Roh (MBC- TV Exit Polls***)	Lee ¹ (MBC- TV Exit Polls***)	
20s (16.9%)	84.6%	59% (60.6% ¹)	34.9% (28.5%)	Age ranges of 5-19 (21.3%)
30s (18%)	61.6%	59.3% (60.5%)	34.2% (33.5%)	“2030 generation (20s+30s)” counting for 35% out of total population
40s (16%)	35.3%	48.1% (43.9%)	47.9% (46.6%)	Evenly divided in election
50s (9.5%)	8.7%	40.1% (28.4%)	57.9% (63%)	
60s (12% ¹)	N/A	34.9%	63.5%	
Total Votes ¹		12,014,27 7 (48.9%)	11,443,297 (46.6%)	24,561,916 ¹ (Total ¹) Rho won by 2.3% margin

* based on Korean National Statistical Office

** Korea Network Information Center (KRNIC: <http://stat.nic.or.kr/>), December 2001

*** Source1: MBC-TV Exit Polls by Kim Ji-ho. December 21, 2002. “Youth Vote, Internet Campaigns behind Victory,” The Korea Herald.

Reaction to Chung’s last minute withdrawal provides timely proof of the main argument of this article: a medium such as the messenger function of the Web portal or cellular phones directly affects election outcomes. Further, this incident addresses Diani’s more general question (2001:207): “How can we credit social movements with responsibility for macro-level changes that might as plausibly be the outcome of far broader cultural and socio- economic processes?” The MBC-TV Exit Polls in the Table 10, which made a comparatively correct estimate of actual votes, strongly supports that explosive usage of Internet and wireless media critically contributed to the victory of its candidate, Rho Moo Hyun. Chung’s abrupt withdrawal of support for Rho provided a rare opportunity to corroborate the correlated relationship between the last minute mobilization of young voters and Rho’s victory. In that 8 hour window, only high speed information technology could have such an effect.

Conclusion

This article demonstrates that Netizen activities in cyberspace have contributed to substantial development in Korea’s democracy, as illustrated in the series of social and political movements from 2000 to 2002 resulting in the formation of the 386 and 2030 Generations as social capital. Furthermore, Korea’s experience of Internet-based social

capital mobilization illuminates the power of newly created cyberspace as an information age public sphere. This sets a precedent for democratic evolution in the presence of mature and active social capital and of wide spread utilization of information technology.

Cyberspace as a new information age public sphere is liberating the young generation from hierarchical and authoritarian political structures. The tradition of strong state and weak society in Korean political culture will decline as the discourse within the young generation is directed toward a more horizontal and democratic system of politics. The public jury system adopted by alliances of civic organizations will gradually dismantle the monopolistic power of government and business in the public domains. A more democratic and distributed web of governance is projected as long as cyberspace discourse remains responsible and authentic.

This article also finds that the digital model of social capital must be added to the literature of social capital, which has mainly been based on the industrial age experience in its formation and evolution. Due to the revolutionary development of information technology, the transition of power from one generation to the next will accelerate, thus maximizing the dynamics of changes in political systems. The duration of the overall learning and educational process between generations will also be shortened. Especially, the Netizen transcends the boundaries of age, job, gender, and education as long as participants share individual inclinations on topics. Social capital that can be cultivated in cyberspace is not bounded by the material and organizational limitations of the industrial age. The nature of the transition in social capital from social to political issues and vice versa is expected to attract broader participation in the body politic.

The dynamics of the Internet and social capital in Korea would not be possible without effective information technology policy and active civic organizations, both products of its modern experience, specifically the developmental state as an outcome of the 1960s-1980s economic development drive and the 1980s anti-authoritarian, democratic movements. The way that social capital evolves in a country even in the information age is likewise largely bound by its own historical and cultural specifics. Further, as widely spread Internet and other information technology interacts with each country's particular history and political culture, the course of democratic evolution in each society will take diverse paths to be determined by the nature and potential of its social capital resources.

References

- Bourdieu, Pierre. (1986) The Forms of Capital, in John Richardson. Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education, New York: Greenwood.
- Carothers, Thomas. (2002) The End of the Transition Paradigm, Journal of Democracy, Volume. ???, Number, ???.
- Choo, Sungsoo and Nam, Jungil. (2001) Korea NGO Report, 2001, Seoul: Hanyang University Press
- Cohen, Jean. (1995). Interpreting the Notion of Civil Society, in Walzer, Michael. ed.1995. Toward a Global Civil Society, Providence and Oxford: BerghahnBooks.
- Chosun.com. (2000) Parties Considering Black List in Picking Candidates, <http://www.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200001/200001190400.html>, (January 19).
- Coleman, J.S. (1988) Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, American Journal of Sociology, 94/Supplement: S95-S120.
- Diani, Mario. (2001) Social Capital as Social Movement Outcome, in Edwards, Bob, Michael Foley and Mario Diani. eds. Beyond Tocqueville: Civil Society and the Social Capital Debate in Comparative Perspective, Hanover and London: University Press of New England.
- Edwards, Bob and Michael Foley. (2001) Civil Society and Social Capital, in Edwards, Bob, Michael Foley and Mario Diani. eds. Beyond Tocqueville: Civil Society and the Social Capital Debate in Comparative Perspective, Hanover and London: University Press of New England.
- Ehrenberg, John. (1999) Civil Society: The Critical History of an Idea, New York and London: New York University Press.
- Fukuyama, Francis. (1995) Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity, New York: Free Press.
- Jin Seong-ho. (2002) New Generation Powers Rho to Victory, The Chosun Ilbo, <http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200212/2002122200007.html>, December 20.
- JoongAng Ilbo. (2000) Civil Organization Releases Political Blacklist, January 10.
- Kellner, Douglas. (1998) Intellectuals, the New Public Spheres, and Techno-Politics, in Toulouse, Chris and Timothy W. Luke, eds. The Politics of Cyberspace, New York and London: Routledge.

- Kim, Hyun-chul. (2002) R-generation born of soccer, English JoongAngIlbo, July 01.
- Kim, Sseong Kyu. (2003). Initiator is the reporter at Ohmynews, Donga.com, January 8.
<http://www.donga.com/fbin/searchview?n=200301080013>
- Knack, Stephen. and Philip Keefer. (1997) Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff?: A Cross-Country Investigation, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, November.
- Korea Herald. (2000) Civic groups, political circle set to clash over rejection drive,
http://www.koreaherald.co.kr/news/2000/01/_02/20000113_0211.htm, January 13.
- Kranzberg, M. (1985) The Information Age: Evolution or Revolution?, in Bruce R. Guile. Ed. Information Technologies and Social Transformation, Washington, D.C. : National Academy Press.
- Kwak, Young-sup. (2002) Record number of cheering fans turn Korea red, The Korea Herald. July 2,
- Kwon, Tae-Hwan and Jae Yul Lee. ??? Networks among Civil Organizations
- The Korea Herald. (2000) Police chief thanks Devils, July 2.
- Lee, Moon Jae and Cha, Hyung Seok. (2002) Netizen in Action in Sisapress.com (687), December 26.
- Lee, Tae Hee and Choi, Hye Jung (2002) IT Generation's Young Politics Won, Internet Hankyoreh, December 20.
- Loader, Brian D. ed. (1998) Cyberspace Divide: Equality, Agency and Policy in the Information Society, London and New York: Routledge.
- Nodia, Ghia. (2002) The Democratic Path, Journal of Democracy, Volume 13, Number 3, July.
- O'Donnell, Guillermo. (2002) In Partial Defense of an Evanescent "Paradigm", Journal of Democracy, Volume 13, Number 3, July.
- OECD. (2001) The Well-Being of Nations, Paris: OECD.
- Park, Kyung Ae. (2001) Development of ICT Indicators in Korea, a report prepared for IA)S Satellite Meeting on Statistics for the Information Society, August 20 and 31, Tokyo Japan.

Point Topic. (2002) DSL passess 30m lines worldwide, December 10, <http://www.point-topic.com/cgi-bin/download.asp?file=DSLAnalysis\Q3+2002+DSL+text+only.htm>

Putnam, Robert D. (1995) Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital, Journal of Democracy, Volume6, Number, 1.

Rosell, Steven A. (1999) Renewing Governance: Governing by Learning in the Information Age, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Wollack, Kenneth. (2002) Retaining the Human Dimension, Journal of Democracy, Volume 13, Number 3, July.

Yang, Sung-jin. (2002) Korea drives World Cup fever with Internet, The Korea Herald, July 1

Yoo, Cheong-mo. (2002) 'Red Devils' cheerers fascinate globe with soccer zeal, manners, The Korea Herald, July 2.

¹ comprised of people in their thirties who were born in the 1960s and were university students during the 1980s and roughly overlaps from college graduates in their late 30s to their early 40s.

² The Hyundai Research Institute, an affiliate of Hyundai Group, named it the "R generation", borrowing from the Red Devils, the red-clad young soccer fans who led the phenomenal stadium and street cheering for Korea's World Cup squad during the June 2002 tournament.

³ Joo and Nam (2001: 25) conducted a newspaper content analysis on the frequency of four different groups: citizen, non-government, private, and social. According to this table, there are four categories in overall civil society: *Shi-Min-Dan-Che* (citizen organizations), NGO, *Min-Gan-Dan-Che* (private organizations), and *Sa-Hoi-Dan-Che* (social organizations) used without clear differentiations in their use. However, all together they are the major categories forming civil society in the Korean context. Newspapers surveyed were two to four major daily newspapers.

⁴ It was through the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, ignited by the controversial disqualification of Korean player Kim Dong Sung in the men's 1,500 meter short track skating final that young Korean Netizens, mostly the R Generation, realized their cyberspace potential and connectedness by overloading major Winter Olympics web sites and that of NBC, which had supported a gold medal for crowd-favorite Apolo Anton Ohno of the United States rather than for Kim.

⁵ Kim, Ki Bo who is the owner of that user ID "Ang-Ma" [www.angma.org], turned out to be a reporter at Ohmynews, where he made his own petition for demonstration under an assumed ID. It became a controversy over the possibility that the Internet can become a tool for scandalous, irresponsible, and manipulative discourse. Refer to Kim (2003).

⁶ See Lee and Cha (2002). Graphic images on the candle light demonstration at Kwanghwamoon and City Hall Plaza can be found at the following url: http://imagesearch.yahoo.co.kr/isurf/263/8785/16701/imgthumb_0.html

⁷ It was established by Lee, Jeong Ki, user ID 'Old Fox,' on April 15, 2000 right after the 2000 General Election. See Chun (2002). "No-Sa-Mo, presidential candidate Rho's Internet-fan club."